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U.S. Department of Commerce

Recent semiconductor supply chain constraints have drawn the attention of Washington policymakers at every level. Exasperated by the global pandemic, customers of semiconductor manufacturers have sounded the alarm about the chip shortage and the downstream consequences for end-user companies and consumers. Global automakers have suffered the brunt of the impact, shuttering factories and slashing vehicle production. Last month President Biden issued an Executive Order (EO) to review and secure America’s supply chains. The stated goals of this review are to revitalize and rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity, maintain America’s competitive edge in research and development, and create well-paying jobs. Under the EO, the U.S. will also work more closely with allies to strengthen supply chains. The EO directs supply chain reviews on several critical segments, including semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging. The Department of Commerce will identify risks throughout the U.S. semiconductor supply chain and make policy recommendations to address those risks within 100 days of the EO’s issuance. In coordination with the White House, Congress is contemplating a variety of measures to address supply chain issues. Recently, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the effects of the U.S. tax code on domestic manufacturing. Both Chairman Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Ranking Member Mike Crapo (R-ID) highlighted their desire for bipartisan cooperation to use the economic tools within the jurisdiction of the committee to bolster domestic manufacturing. The committee discussed two pieces of legislation that would provide significant incentives to domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. The first was the investment tax credit (ITC) for semiconductor manufacturing that was included in last year’s CHIPS for America Act but not with the other semiconductor incentives in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). An ITC would provide predictability and stability in the U.S. tax code to promote large, long-term investments for the industry. The second was the American Innovation and Jobs Act, which repeals the R D amortization requirement set to go into effect in 2022 and expands the refundable tax credit for startups and small businesses. Enhancing domestic incentives for R D and manufacturing is an important step in putting the U.S. on equal footing with other countries and would promote its continued leadership in the chip industry. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) has announced his intention to craft a package of measures to strengthen U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis China. The package reportedly would include funding for the microelectronics R D and Commerce grant programs that were passed in the NDAA. The Senate plans to take up the legislation in April. SEMI applauds the renewed focus on incentivizing domestic manufacturing and R D for an industry that enables countless technologies, drives innovation in sectors throughout the U.S. economy, and powers the electronic systems essential to critical infrastructure and defense systems. We look forward to working with policymakers in Congress and the Administration to support the entire domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Kimberly Ekmark is director of Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI
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As the Biden administration begins to advance its policy goals through U.S. government agencies, SEMI is eager to work with these new officials and appointees to advance innovation and strengthen U.S. leadership in the microelectronics industry. SEMI President and CEO Ajit Manocha today sent a letter to Commerce Secretary-Designate Gina Raimondo advocating for strengthening American manufacturing, investing in research and development and pursuing multilateral rather than unilateral U.S. export controls. SEMI also “requests Commerce perform a comprehensive review of recent policies and formally seek industry input via publication of a Notice of Inquiry (NOI), giving industry its first formal opportunity to provide its views on these significant regulations.” The letter discusses the importance of how export controls are implemented, advocating that “multilateral controls – where items of concern are controlled by all major producing nations – create a level playing field, maximize effectiveness, and minimize harm to U.S. national security and economic competitiveness. Unilateral U.S. controls over items for which there are comparable non-U.S.-origin items are generally ineffective in supporting national security goals and are likely to erode any technological advantages enjoyed by U.S.-origin items.” Foreign availability of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, materials and design software is an important consideration for U.S. export control policy related to those items. In an appendix to the letter, SEMI provided charts detailing the foreign availability of major types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials. For nearly all items, there are competitive alternatives to U.S.-origin items available from non-U.S. sources. With many semiconductor technologies concentrated in a handful of key exporting nations, the letter encourages a unified approach via a plurilateral export control regime instead of unilateral U.S. controls for these technologies. SEMI provided a framework of issues that need to be considered and properly addressed in negotiating a plurilateral agreement related to semiconductor industry export controls. The previous administration created several unilateral controls that were implemented with little or no opportunity for public or industry comment and which created several unintended consequences. In addition to the request to publish an NOI, the letter asks Commerce to correct unintended controls related to the August 2020 expansion of EAR General Prohibition Three and reduce the backlog of license and classification requests. SEMI is pleased to work with the U.S. Department of Commerce and other policymakers by providing industry data, trends and perspectives to ensure export controls effectively serve national security interests without undue harm to technological development and leadership in this dynamic, globally competitive industry. Kimberly Ekmark is director of Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI.
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As the United States government has expanded semiconductor-related export controls, companies in the global electronics manufacturing and design supply chain have had to spend considerable time and effort navigating restrictions and managing significant new uncertainties emanating from recent policies. On November 9, SEMI submitted comments to the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) urging the agency to proceed cautiously and adopt regulatory best practices and microelectronics industry recommendations to ensure that its identification of foundational technologies does not restrain U.S. innovation and exports without furthering essential U.S. national security interests. The comments specifically respond to the August 27 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), Identification and Review of Controls for Certain Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018 required BIS identify certain emerging and foundational technology that is “essential” to U.S. national security and requires such technology to be controlled to China and other nations subject to a U.S. arms embargo. Congress did not provide a specific definition for emerging or foundational technology, nor the term essential, further complicating the process to identify such technology.BIS has already implemented or proposed several emerging technology controls and the ANPRM starts the process to identify potential foundational technology controls. The SEMI comments focus on the fundamental question of how to define foundational technology, and are organized into three main sections: Requirements of ECRA Guidance from ECRA Regulatory best practices and industry recommendations Applying the statutory requirements and guidance, together with best practices and recommendations, to the identification of foundational technology indicates that most semiconductor-related technology, particularly semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials, should be outside the bounds of the foundational technology initiative. In general, most technology related to semiconductor devices, manufacturing equipment, materials and design software is not essential to U.S. national security and, in cases where such technology does present material national security issues, it is generally subject to the U.S. list review process and multilateral controls. This technology is widely available outside the United States and due to substantial foreign availability, unilateral U.S. controls on such technology are likely to be ineffective in limiting its proliferation and harm U.S. development of or threaten U.S. leadership in this technology.While the SEMI comments focus on the effort to identify foundational technology, the recommendations and best practices apply in all export control contexts. Several of the statements pertain to policy in ECRA, including its imposition of controls to further specific essential U.S. national security interests only after full consideration of their impact on the economy.Other statements derive from factors ECRA requires BIS to consider, such as not seeking to control technology that’s already available outside the U.S. and not imposing controls that would harm U.S. technological development or leadership. An additional key factor is not imposing controls before multilateral controls are agreed to, nor when it is unlikely the relevant multilateral regimes will adopt similar controls, as is likely for technology that has been decontrolled by a regime.Finally, regulatory best practices suggest that technology-based controls should not be imposed when more targeted end-use or end-user controls can address national security concerns and duplicative controls in addition to recent, significant expansions of existing controls are unnecessary.SEMI is pleased to work with the U.S. Department of Commerce and other regulatory agencies, providing industry data, trends and perspectives to ensure export controls effectively serve national security interests without undue harm to technological development and leadership in this dynamic, globally competitive industry.Ways to Stay Connected and Learn MoreSEMI is committed to serving the global electronics manufacturing and design supply chain and present the collective voice of members to governments worldwide.The SEMI Global Update weekly newsletter provides updates on advocacy issues and technology trends and is available to all.Additionally, SEMI hosts live and virtual events that offer analysis and insights of geopolitical trends by industry experts, with the next opportunity to participate coming on December 3 with the SEMI CEO Webinar: Analyzing the Impact of the U.S. Election on the Microelectronics Industry.Joe Pasetti is Vice President of Global Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI.
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For the past several months, U.S. Department of Commerce officials have been developing proposals to amend the foreign direct product rule to require a license for the use of U.S.-origin semiconductor manufacturing equipment or technology in producing semiconductor devices for Huawei and its affiliates. Commerce has also advanced proposals to amend the de minimis rule to expand license requirements for shipments to Huawei and its affiliates of semiconductors produced outside the U.S. and incorporating minimal amounts of non-sensitive U.S. content.The expansion of both rules is among the many Huawei-related actions the administration is pursuing that include a government procurement ban, replacing Huawei equipment in rural U.S. networks, and prohibiting imports of technology and services from unspecified foreign adversary nations. The de minimis proposal was under final interagency review, and the direct product rule next in line for further action, when on February 18 President Trump issued a tweet saying that “The United States cannot, will not, become such a difficult place to deal with in terms of foreign countries buying our product, including for the always used National Security excuse, that our companies will be forced to leave in order to remain competitive.”Speaking to reporters later that day, the president, referring to chipmakers and Huawei, said “I think people were getting carried away with it… Things are put on my desk that have nothing to do with national security.”This week, SEMI President and CEO Ajit Manocha sent President Trump a thank-you letter for his comments and warned that the proposals could severely impact the U.S. and global semiconductor and electronics industries, create confusion and uncertainty in manufacturing supply chains, reduce investment in new capacity, and lead to the design-out of U.S. technology and U.S. components. SEMI also stressed that unilateral controls on U.S.-origin semiconductor devices, equipment, materials and technology could significantly and disproportionately harm U.S. companies, serve as a disincentive for further investments and innovation in the U.S., and impact non-U.S. companies as well. SEMI continues to work with policymakers to build awareness of the damaging and far-reaching effects of these proposals. The 2020 sales forecast for the global semiconductor manufacturing equipment market, excluding the U.S. (since the proposals only directly affect non-U.S. fabs), is approximately $53 billion. With U.S. producers accounting for roughly 40 percent market share, over $21 billion in U.S. equipment sales to non-U.S. fabs could be affected. Non-U.S. companies whose equipment incorporates U.S.-origin components and technology could also be impacted, and every fab worldwide using U.S.-origin manufacturing equipment or technology to produce items destined for Huawei would need to stop their use immediately and file for a license and/or remove U.S.-origin equipment and technology from production lines used for Huawei and its affiliates. The president’s remarks, along with the resignation of two key officials supporting the proposals, have created uncertainty around the next steps. SEMI is holding regular conference calls to keep members up to date and developing strong messages for members to use in their communications with government officials. SEMI Advocacy in Washington remains actively engaged with executive and congressional officials to ensure that U.S. export controls are narrowly tailored to specific national security concerns and applied at the multilateral level with major trading partners.Joe Pasetti is Vice President of Global Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI.
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Tensions between the United States and China have reached fever pitch. Ongoing trade negotiations between the U.S. and China broke down earlier this month over reported backpedaling by China on key concessions in a proposed Trump administration deal. Over the past year, the U.S. has raised tariffs on more than $250 billion worth of Chinese goods to 25 percent, and last week the administration proposed tariff hikes on an additional $300 billion in imports – moves that have drawn retaliatory tariffs from China, many squarely hitting the semiconductor industry. Based on SEMI member feedback, the tariff increases will cost the semiconductor industry more than $750 million annually.At the same time, the Trump Administration is taking other steps to ratchet up pressure on China. Last week, seven months after placing Fujian Jinhua on the Entity List, which effectively blocks the sale of and export of goods to China, the U.S. Department of Commerce added Huawei (and nearly 70 affiliates) to the list. While the U.S. is taking this action for security reasons, it is also seen as a move to create leverage at the trade table. The U.S. is also intensifying efforts to reform the export control regime, focusing first on enhancing controls on emerging technologies and then on foundational technologies. The rising pressure has prompted China to contemplate and launch a counteroffensive that goes well beyond tariffs and export controls. The reprisals include China’s promotion of heightened Chinese nationalism by domestic consumers, a tactical slowdown of administrative processes required to conduct business in China, and the imposition of direct or indirect limits to market access. China is also using U.S. actions to justify larger state investments in its domestic industry and is ramping up efforts to give other regions greater access to its markets as it works to strengthen those relations ahead of next month’s G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. The U.S. is also maneuvering to bolster its negotiating hand through its own agreements with Japan and the European Union.Unintended consequences of Trump administration actionsThe Trump administration’s moves to rectify the trade imbalance with China are also well-intentioned in seeking to protect the IP of U.S. technology companies and ensure continued U.S. leadership in technology development and innovation. However, its tactics can encourage long-term, perverse shifts in the globally integrated electronics manufacturing supply chain that risk upending market-driven investments in the semiconductor industry and weakening natural market forces that nourish competition among companies based on service, quality and product offerings.It is critical for SEMI, in working with government officials, to shed light on the potentially deep, unintended damage its trade actions can wreak on global supply chains and markets. We will continue to promote global standards governing trade, IP and market access through our Global Trade Principles and focus on sustaining a global order that assures the electronics manufacturing supply chain remains cohesive and vibrant.SEMI continues efforts to influence trade policyWe continue to meet with government policymakers around the world to educate them on near- and long-term impacts and risks of their evolving trade practices, conducting approximately 220 meetings with government officials globally in the past year. We also facilitate individual and group member meetings to give SEMI members direct contact to key government decision-makers. For example, on May 22nd during the SEMI Spring Washington Forum, or “fly-in,” more than 30 semiconductor industry executives from across the supply chain met with administration officials and Congressional offices to discuss issues including trade, export controls and immigration reform and impacts on their businesses. The executives represented a cross-section of small, medium, large and global companies based in the U.S. or providing support for U.S. organizations. Their aim: influence policy development. SEMI is in a unique position as a representative of the end-to-end, global electronics manufacturing supply chain and is a valuable “one-stop-shop” that represents members on policy while providing opportunities to collaborate in one of our Technology Communities. SEMI members can also leverage our strategic partnerships, our market research or leadership in industry standards. With this breadth and depth of member engagement and industry expertise, SEMI leads in providing industry insights to governments at this critical time. There is no doubt that the current situation is complicated and it is impossible to predict when or how the trade issues will be settled. As the U.S. and China work to settle the trade dispute, SEMI will continue to lead efforts to ensure that the voices of SEMI members and the electronics industry supply chain are heard.Mike Russo is vice president of Global Industry Advocacy at SEMI.
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Meeting Attended by More than 100 Tech Company RepresentativesOver the past decade, China has become a central market for the semiconductor industry. China is now home to more than 30 percent of semiconductor end users worldwide. All semiconductor companies, regardless of size, operate in China. The rise of China’s semiconductor market has been enabled by global commerce and a vast network of supply chains that span the globe.With China now a prominent player in the industry, it has become critically important for semiconductor companies to effectively engage with China. In order to help our member companies better understand the challenges and opportunities and navigate what can be a complex landscape, SEMI hosts annual trade compliance conferences in China for trade professionals. This year, SEMI, with CompTIA and U.S. Information Technology Office (USITO), hosted two global trade seminars in China, one in Shanghai on October 30th and the other in Beijing on November 1st.Over 120 representatives from more than two dozen technology companies attended the 2018 trade compliance seminars. Over the course of the two sessions, speakers from government, business, and law firms highlighted the most pressing trade issues in China. Speakers included thought leaders, trade practitioners and senior Chinese government officials.Sessions included a deep dive on China’s draft customs reform law, a panel discussion on U.S. export controls, and a briefing on how best to engage with China Customs and how China’s products are classified. Another well-received session focused on the status of China’s export control law, which has been in the drafting process for years.However, the overarching question for many attendees was U.S.-China economic relations, which are undergoing a sea change, with the U.S. having imposed or threatened tariffs on all imports from China – totaling more than $500 billion in goods – over the past six months. As a speaker noted during a session on the U.S.-China tensions and the surrounding broader geopolitical impacts, the environment is becoming increasingly complex and volatile. In fact, on the morning of the first session, Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit was added to the U.S. Commerce Department’s entity list, which effectively restricts exports to the company.As a result of the trade actions, ranging from tariffs to enhanced export controls, U.S. semiconductor companies are beginning to increase prices, reduce research and development (R D) budgets, restructure supply chains and take other mitigation actions that will ultimately slow innovation. Certain export controls and other regulations that prohibit U.S.-companies from conducting business with targeted companies will put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.In fact and as we speak, some companies with China-based operations have cancelled orders from U.S. companies and shifted to suppliers that are not subject to U.S. actions to reduce the associated risks of supply interruption and cost increases. Ultimately, U.S. trade policy could backfire, threatening jobs, curbing growth, cutting U.S. R D investments and compromising the competitiveness of U.S. firms.SEMI will begin planning next year’s Global Trade Seminar in the coming months. If you would like to be involved in the planning, or would simply like more information about the seminar, please contact Jay Chittooran, Public Policy Manager at SEMI, at [email protected].
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