US Public Policy

Recent semiconductor supply chain constraints have drawn the attention of Washington policymakers at every level. Exasperated by the global pandemic, customers of semiconductor manufacturers have sounded the alarm about the chip shortage and the downstream consequences for end-user companies and consumers. Global automakers have suffered the brunt of the impact, shuttering factories and slashing vehicle production. Last month President Biden issued an Executive Order (EO) to review and secure America’s supply chains. The stated goals of this review are to revitalize and rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity, maintain America’s competitive edge in research and development, and create well-paying jobs. Under the EO, the U.S. will also work more closely with allies to strengthen supply chains. The EO directs supply chain reviews on several critical segments, including semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging. The Department of Commerce will identify risks throughout the U.S. semiconductor supply chain and make policy recommendations to address those risks within 100 days of the EO’s issuance. In coordination with the White House, Congress is contemplating a variety of measures to address supply chain issues. Recently, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on the effects of the U.S. tax code on domestic manufacturing. Both Chairman Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Ranking Member Mike Crapo (R-ID) highlighted their desire for bipartisan cooperation to use the economic tools within the jurisdiction of the committee to bolster domestic manufacturing. The committee discussed two pieces of legislation that would provide significant incentives to domestic manufacturing of semiconductors. The first was the investment tax credit (ITC) for semiconductor manufacturing that was included in last year’s CHIPS for America Act but not with the other semiconductor incentives in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). An ITC would provide predictability and stability in the U.S. tax code to promote large, long-term investments for the industry. The second was the American Innovation and Jobs Act, which repeals the R D amortization requirement set to go into effect in 2022 and expands the refundable tax credit for startups and small businesses. Enhancing domestic incentives for R D and manufacturing is an important step in putting the U.S. on equal footing with other countries and would promote its continued leadership in the chip industry. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) has announced his intention to craft a package of measures to strengthen U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis China. The package reportedly would include funding for the microelectronics R D and Commerce grant programs that were passed in the NDAA. The Senate plans to take up the legislation in April. SEMI applauds the renewed focus on incentivizing domestic manufacturing and R D for an industry that enables countless technologies, drives innovation in sectors throughout the U.S. economy, and powers the electronic systems essential to critical infrastructure and defense systems. We look forward to working with policymakers in Congress and the Administration to support the entire domestic semiconductor ecosystem. Kimberly Ekmark is director of Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI

For the past several months, U.S. Department of Commerce officials have been developing proposals to amend the foreign direct product rule to require a license for the use of U.S.-origin semiconductor manufacturing equipment or technology in producing semiconductor devices for Huawei and its affiliates. Commerce has also advanced proposals to amend the de minimis rule to expand license requirements for shipments to Huawei and its affiliates of semiconductors produced outside the U.S. and incorporating minimal amounts of non-sensitive U.S. content.The expansion of both rules is among the many Huawei-related actions the administration is pursuing that include a government procurement ban, replacing Huawei equipment in rural U.S. networks, and prohibiting imports of technology and services from unspecified foreign adversary nations. The de minimis proposal was under final interagency review, and the direct product rule next in line for further action, when on February 18 President Trump issued a tweet saying that “The United States cannot, will not, become such a difficult place to deal with in terms of foreign countries buying our product, including for the always used National Security excuse, that our companies will be forced to leave in order to remain competitive.”Speaking to reporters later that day, the president, referring to chipmakers and Huawei, said “I think people were getting carried away with it… Things are put on my desk that have nothing to do with national security.”This week, SEMI President and CEO Ajit Manocha sent President Trump a thank-you letter for his comments and warned that the proposals could severely impact the U.S. and global semiconductor and electronics industries, create confusion and uncertainty in manufacturing supply chains, reduce investment in new capacity, and lead to the design-out of U.S. technology and U.S. components. SEMI also stressed that unilateral controls on U.S.-origin semiconductor devices, equipment, materials and technology could significantly and disproportionately harm U.S. companies, serve as a disincentive for further investments and innovation in the U.S., and impact non-U.S. companies as well. SEMI continues to work with policymakers to build awareness of the damaging and far-reaching effects of these proposals. The 2020 sales forecast for the global semiconductor manufacturing equipment market, excluding the U.S. (since the proposals only directly affect non-U.S. fabs), is approximately $53 billion. With U.S. producers accounting for roughly 40 percent market share, over $21 billion in U.S. equipment sales to non-U.S. fabs could be affected. Non-U.S. companies whose equipment incorporates U.S.-origin components and technology could also be impacted, and every fab worldwide using U.S.-origin manufacturing equipment or technology to produce items destined for Huawei would need to stop their use immediately and file for a license and/or remove U.S.-origin equipment and technology from production lines used for Huawei and its affiliates. The president’s remarks, along with the resignation of two key officials supporting the proposals, have created uncertainty around the next steps. SEMI is holding regular conference calls to keep members up to date and developing strong messages for members to use in their communications with government officials. SEMI Advocacy in Washington remains actively engaged with executive and congressional officials to ensure that U.S. export controls are narrowly tailored to specific national security concerns and applied at the multilateral level with major trading partners.Joe Pasetti is Vice President of Global Public Policy and Advocacy at SEMI.

Tensions between the United States and China have reached fever pitch. Ongoing trade negotiations between the U.S. and China broke down earlier this month over reported backpedaling by China on key concessions in a proposed Trump administration deal. Over the past year, the U.S. has raised tariffs on more than $250 billion worth of Chinese goods to 25 percent, and last week the administration proposed tariff hikes on an additional $300 billion in imports – moves that have drawn retaliatory tariffs from China, many squarely hitting the semiconductor industry. Based on SEMI member feedback, the tariff increases will cost the semiconductor industry more than $750 million annually.At the same time, the Trump Administration is taking other steps to ratchet up pressure on China. Last week, seven months after placing Fujian Jinhua on the Entity List, which effectively blocks the sale of and export of goods to China, the U.S. Department of Commerce added Huawei (and nearly 70 affiliates) to the list. While the U.S. is taking this action for security reasons, it is also seen as a move to create leverage at the trade table. The U.S. is also intensifying efforts to reform the export control regime, focusing first on enhancing controls on emerging technologies and then on foundational technologies. The rising pressure has prompted China to contemplate and launch a counteroffensive that goes well beyond tariffs and export controls. The reprisals include China’s promotion of heightened Chinese nationalism by domestic consumers, a tactical slowdown of administrative processes required to conduct business in China, and the imposition of direct or indirect limits to market access. China is also using U.S. actions to justify larger state investments in its domestic industry and is ramping up efforts to give other regions greater access to its markets as it works to strengthen those relations ahead of next month’s G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan. The U.S. is also maneuvering to bolster its negotiating hand through its own agreements with Japan and the European Union.Unintended consequences of Trump administration actionsThe Trump administration’s moves to rectify the trade imbalance with China are also well-intentioned in seeking to protect the IP of U.S. technology companies and ensure continued U.S. leadership in technology development and innovation. However, its tactics can encourage long-term, perverse shifts in the globally integrated electronics manufacturing supply chain that risk upending market-driven investments in the semiconductor industry and weakening natural market forces that nourish competition among companies based on service, quality and product offerings.It is critical for SEMI, in working with government officials, to shed light on the potentially deep, unintended damage its trade actions can wreak on global supply chains and markets. We will continue to promote global standards governing trade, IP and market access through our Global Trade Principles and focus on sustaining a global order that assures the electronics manufacturing supply chain remains cohesive and vibrant.SEMI continues efforts to influence trade policyWe continue to meet with government policymakers around the world to educate them on near- and long-term impacts and risks of their evolving trade practices, conducting approximately 220 meetings with government officials globally in the past year. We also facilitate individual and group member meetings to give SEMI members direct contact to key government decision-makers. For example, on May 22nd during the SEMI Spring Washington Forum, or “fly-in,” more than 30 semiconductor industry executives from across the supply chain met with administration officials and Congressional offices to discuss issues including trade, export controls and immigration reform and impacts on their businesses. The executives represented a cross-section of small, medium, large and global companies based in the U.S. or providing support for U.S. organizations. Their aim: influence policy development. SEMI is in a unique position as a representative of the end-to-end, global electronics manufacturing supply chain and is a valuable “one-stop-shop” that represents members on policy while providing opportunities to collaborate in one of our Technology Communities. SEMI members can also leverage our strategic partnerships, our market research or leadership in industry standards. With this breadth and depth of member engagement and industry expertise, SEMI leads in providing industry insights to governments at this critical time. There is no doubt that the current situation is complicated and it is impossible to predict when or how the trade issues will be settled. As the U.S. and China work to settle the trade dispute, SEMI will continue to lead efforts to ensure that the voices of SEMI members and the electronics industry supply chain are heard.Mike Russo is vice president of Global Industry Advocacy at SEMI.

With (most of) the election results in from the U.S. midterms, the expected Democratic takeover of the House and the Republican’s maintaining control of the Senate is now a reality. The day of the election, DC insiders expected that the House would go to the Democrats by a margin of +/- 20, with the Republicans gaining 2-3 seats in the Senate. Not a bad prediction, which is a far cry from what the same insiders called in advance of the 2016 Presidential election.What does that mean for our members and the tech sector in general? Will there be an ease of trade tensions or less of a chance of tighter export controls? Some believe that with the midterm elections over, President Trump will have some room to take a less aggressive stance against China, setting up a “win” that he can carry into 2020. With the recent more aggressive stance by North Korea against the U.S. regarding its nuclear program, China may well have some leverage at the trade table … and the U.S. may want to make a deal that provides a path for a “win” on both fronts. Indeed, there are the makings of a potential win-win leading into the G20 meeting in Argentina when President Xi Jinping and President Trump are scheduled to meet on Dec. 1.One can see a scenario where there is a meeting of the minds and some degree of lessening tariffs; that does not mean that the effort to enhance export controls will go away. The need for tighter restrictions on export controls is driven to a great degree by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and is a follow on from the previous FIRRMA legislation and attempts to curb the loss of U.S. technology critical to global competitiveness and national security. This issue will not go away anytime soon, and cases like the recent one involving Jinhua only add fuel to the fire. In addition, given how these cases can be leveraged at the negotiating table, they will continue to surface.SEMI’s approach has been to educate governments, lawmakers and administration officials on the strategic importance of the globally connected and highly complex semiconductor supply chain, and how some of the approaches will not achieve the attended goals. This approach helps to ensure that when and if it comes time to make decisions based on merit, the principals are informed. It also helps SEMI and its members develop and maintain important relationships and positions SEMI as an industry leader and spokesperson, making it a more effective advocate. As an example, on Nov 8th SEMI released its Global Trade Principles with the intention of providing a framework to all governments to guide various trade talks. It also helps to inform member companies and others from the broader tech sector of our industry position(s) so we are able to speak with one voice. These principles are aligned with our fundamental advocacy pillars of promoting free trade and market access, respect for IP, cybersecurity and national security.Will the fact that power is now split between the two chambers of Congress help or hurt? Will the House focus on investigations limit the ability to move productive legislation? Besides taking time, it may well put them at increasingly worse odds with the Senate and the President (if that is possible), creating deadlock. Some argue that if nothing moves, no harm can be done. Some also say that it may drive the President to take independent and more aggressive actions in order to demonstrate (his) effectiveness to his base. There is another view: that with the Democrats, the President may be able to lead in the advancement of legislation that will show he can get things done when others couldn’t in areas that benefit the greater good…some of which may impact our industry…such as investments in education and infrastructure development. This would be a way that he could pull in some of the votes from the middle that he has lost in his first two years in office. They say “politics makes for strange bedfellows”; one never knows what might happen in this case.Regardless of what happens, some things will not change: the global nature of our business and the needs of our members to have access to markets…and to be able to safely and efficiently leverage their technologies in the way they see fit in order to grow their business. SEMI will continue to advance the interests in what is an extremely challenging and dynamic global policy environment today. As ruling parties and representatives change around the globe, we will continue to build new relationships and educate lawmakers so they are able to make informed decisions that benefit our members. Mike Russo is VP of Public Policy and Talent Advocacy at SEMI.

Last week, SEMI joined a coalition of business groups in calling for Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, to enact an exclusion process for the most recent tranche of tariffs on $200 billion in goods imported from China. While an exclusion process was provided for in the previous tariff lists, which cover about $50 billion in goods, the administration has said that no similar process will be provided on the most recent tariffs on $200 billion (List 3), which took effect Monday. SEMI members will face millions of dollars in additional duties as a result of these tariffs. This action will also curb growth, stifle innovation, and introduce significant uncertainty in the semiconductor industry. Americans for Free Trade is a diverse coalition, which includes hundreds of companies across the United States, to illustrate the impacts of tariffs on American businesses, consumers and manufacturers. SEMI is a member of this coalition. The full text of the letter can be found here. Any SEMI members with questions should contact Jay Chittooran, Public Policy Manager at SEMI, at [email protected].

The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), based on findings from its Section 301 investigation into China's trade practices, today announced a 25 percent tariff on $34 billion in Chinese goods including many products in the semiconductor supply chain.Products such as test and inspection equipment and spare parts that enter the U.S. from China will be subject to this tariff, which enters into force on July 6, 2018. About 80 percent of the semiconductor products originally proposed remain on the final list of tariffs.USTR also has proposed tariffs on more than $16 billion worth of goods including chemicals as well as machines and spare parts that are used to manufacture semiconductor devices, wafers, flat panel displays, and masks, all of which would squarely strike the semiconductor industry. This new proposed list includes products identified by the U.S. government that have particularly benefited from Chinese industrial policies such as “Made in China 2025.” SEMI is set to voice its opposition to these tariffs with written comments and at an upcoming public hearing.Over the past month, SEMI has submitted written comments and offered testimony on the damaging impact that tariffs would have on the U.S. semiconductor industry. While SEMI strongly supports efforts to better protect valuable intellectual property, we believe that these tariffs will do nothing to address U.S. concerns over China’s trade practices. Instead, the tariffs will harm companies in the semiconductor supply chain by increasing business costs, introducing uncertainty and stifling innovation.SEMI will continue to engage with lawmakers as the $34 billion in tariffs take effect and the proposed $16 billion in duties remain under consideration. We encourage members to review this list and determine the level, if any, of impact. If you have questions or concerns, please reach out to Jay Chittooran, Public Policy Manager at SEMI, at [email protected].

Following through on his 2016 campaign promise, President Trump is implementing trade policies that buck conventional wisdom in Washington, D.C. and among U.S. businesses. Stiff tariffs and the dismantling of longstanding trade agreements – cornerstones of these new actions – will ripple through the semiconductor industry with particularly damaging effect. China, a chief target of criticism from President Trump, has again found itself in the crosshairs of the administration, with trade tensions rising to a fever pitch.The Trump Administration has long criticized China for what it considers unfair trade practices, often homing in on intellectual property. In August 2017, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), charged with developing and recommending U.S trade policy to the president, launched a Section 301 investigation into whether China’s practice of forced technology transfer has discriminated against U.S. firms. As the probe continues, it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States will impose tariffs on China based on its current findings. Reports suggest that the tariffs could come soon, hitting a range of products from consumer electronics to toys. Other measures could include tightening restrictions on the trade of dual-use goods – those with both commercial and military applications – curbing Chinese investment in the United States, and imposing strict limits on the number of visas issued to Chinese citizens. With China a major and intensifying force in the semiconductor supply chain, raising tariffs hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the U.S. and global economies. A tariff-ignited trade war with China could stifle innovation, undermine the long-term health of the semiconductor industry, and lead to unintended consequences such as higher consumer prices, lower productivity, job losses and, on a global scale, a brake on economic growth. Other recently announced U.S. trade actions could also cloud the future for semiconductor companies. The Trump administration, based on two separate Section 232 investigations claiming that overproduction of both steel and aluminum are a threat to U.S. national security, recently levied a series of tariffs and quotas on every country except Canada and Mexico. While these tariffs have yet to take effect, the mere prospect has angered U.S. trading partners – most notably Korea, the European Union and China. Several countries have threatened retaliatory action and others have taken their case to the World Trade Organization. Trade is oxygen to the semiconductor industry, which grew by nearly 30 percent last year and is expected to be valued at an estimated $1 trillion by 2030. Make no mistake: SEMI fully supports efforts to buttress intellectual property protections. However, the Trump administration’s unfolding trade policy could antagonize U.S. trade partners. For its part, SEMI is weighing in with USTR on these issues, underscoring the critical importance of trade to the semiconductor industry as we educate policymakers on trade barriers to industry growth and encourage unobstructed cross-border commerce to advance semiconductors and the emerging technologies they enable. On behalf of our members, we continue our work to increase global market access and lessen the regulatory burden on global trade. If you are interested in more information on trade, or how to be involved in SEMI’s public policy program, please contact Jay Chittooran, Public Policy Manager, at [email protected].

Foreign investment, which fuels technological innovation, productivity, and broad-based growth, is critical to the semiconductor industry’s long-term success. That stream of billions of dollars in investment, however, is at risk of narrowing as a result of the industry’s growing scrutiny by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).Over the last two years, CFIUS, a government body formed to review sales and transfer of ownership of U.S. companies to foreign entities, has denied sales of Aixtron and Lattice Semiconductor to Chinese investors because of national security concerns. More recently, CFIUS rejected the sale of Xcerra to a Chinese company, and the Committee has reportedly become involved in Broadcom’s bid to take over Qualcomm.As highlighted recently, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) was introduced by Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) and Rep. Robert Pittenger (R-NC) in November to reform CFIUS, whose form and function have remained unchanged for over a decade. In the spirit of more effective governance that matches global trends, we welcome efforts to ensure that CFIUS better balances global commerce and national security. FIRRMA contains important reforms to drive new efficiencies within CFIUS to help alleviate its rising workload, including devoting badly needed resources to the committee. Among those reforms is the codification of regulations to ensure that a Senate-confirmed appointee with direct responsibility for investment reviews is installed in each CFIUS agency. Notably, however, FIRRMA fails to adequately address several existing problems with CFIUS and, in some cases, creates new ones. First, this legislation dramatically expands CFIUS’s authority, including allowing it to review any non-passive investment by a foreign investor in a U.S. critical technology or critical infrastructure company, even if the investor does not have control over the company. By defining businesses as a critical technology or critical infrastructure company, FIRRMA would subject companies, and not transactions, to review. This means that transactions from a critical technology company that involve non-critical technologies would be subject to unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly CFIUS review. Second, FIRRMA would require the committee to review joint ventures or any other common arrangements that involve sharing intellectual property with a non-U.S. partner. As a result, CFIUS, for the first time ever, would be charged with reviewing outbound international commercial activity. We believe that this is a serious flaw in the bill that would only duplicate the existing U.S. export control regime while adding another layer of regulatory burden. Third, FIRRMA would create different tracks for CFIUS scrutiny based on the origin of the investors. Countries of special concern, like China or Russia, would be subject to enhanced review while other countries with an approved CFIUS-like body, or that have a defense treaty with the United States, would be fully exempt from CFIUS review. This inherent bias seems to challenge the central tenet of U.S. investment policy – non-discrimination. Lastly, FIRRMA establishes provisions for expanded consultation and information sharing with allies. These provisions could lead, even if unintentionally, to needlessly divulging proprietary information and technology. Over the past year, there’s been greater focus on the stronger enforcement on foreign commerce and the protection of U.S. industries. FIRRMA fits squarely in this area. However, instead of creating sweeping barriers with economy-wide implications, a better approach would be to have higher fences around select items. This would help maintain the current investment stream that is vital nourishment for the semiconductor industry and the broader economy while also protecting national security. SEMI will continue working to open new markets while reducing the regulatory burden that can stifle cross-border trade and commerce. In addition, SEMI will continue to educate policymakers on the critical importance of unobstructed trade and investment in advancing semiconductors and the emerging technologies they enable. If you are interested in more information on foreign investment, CFIUS, or FIRRMA, or in how to be involved in SEMI’s public policy program, please contact Jay Chittooran, Manager, Public Policy, at [email protected].

The White House has released its fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget proposal just as Congress secured a two-year budget deal that will begin the process of wrapping up the rest of FY 2018 and set the government’s top line spending for FY 2019 as well. Included in both of these plans are funding levels for government agencies that are crucial to the basic research underpinning many of the building blocks for future innovation in the semiconductor industry. Funding for the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes for Standards and Technology (NIST) are two of the biggest drivers for basic research in the U.S. government, with many other smaller agencies playing a role as well.In a bipartisan compromise, Congressional leaders agreed to a deal that would lift their self-imposed spending caps for FY 2018 and pump an additional $68 billion into non-defense discretionary spending for FY 2019. They now have until March 23 to approve a detailed spending plan for the rest of this fiscal year before moving on to complete the FY 2019 plan by the end of September. While the final spending levels for individual agencies have yet to be finalized for FY 2018, the additional funding bodes well for both NSF and NIST, which had seen cuts of between 2 percent and 9 percent in earlier drafts of spending bills.Meanwhile, the president’s FY 2019 budget plans to flat fund NSF for the next year, while making cuts to NIST of over 30 percent. Included in these cost reductions are proposals to eliminate the popular Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership, which provides assistance to small and medium-size manufacturers throughout the U.S. With the program providing funds to states with up to a 50 percent match, its elimination will face strong opposition from both parties in Congress. The president’s budget cuts also target the popular Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E) for elimination. Disbanding the agency would end multiple streams of funding for innovations in energy production and storage.While it is the responsibility of the president to submit his budget for the funding of the federal government, the power of the purse resides with Congress. The process of federal funding has been drawn out more than usual this year, with a short-term government shutdown even playing a small role. With the budget agreement now in place, the rest of the funding for FY 2018 should come by the upcoming deadline, with hopes that Congress can then quickly pivot to FY 2019. With the midterm elections coming in November, however, political implications will play an outsized roll in the process for the remainder of the year. SEMI strongly advocates for the position that funding of basic research is closely linked with our nation’s economic prosperity in the modern global economy. Effective research funding as a national priority should be bipartisan and must be backed up by a strong and united community of stakeholders and advocates in the business, research, and education communities. In addition, this funding must not only be robust but consistent and not subjected to the uncertainty of short-term stop gap budget measures. If you’d like to learn more about SEMI’s public policy program, please contact Jamie Girard at [email protected].