





EU Policy Brief

April 2026






Key Policy & International Highlights


Industrial Policy

-  SEMI Europe Policy Forum to take place on June 3rd in Brussels, Belgium
-  European Union’s Institutions agree on a fast-tracked roadmap for the adoption of EU tech and industrial policies
-  European Parliament suggests new industrialisation instrument, including for semiconductors, and attributes dedicated budget envelopes to tech infrastructures in future EU budget
-  European Commission enters final internal validation process ahead the publication of the Chips Act 2.0 proposal

Trade and Geopolitics

-  The U.S. and European Union finalise Critical Minerals Action Plan
-  U.S lawmakers ramp up chip controls, raising stakes ahead of Trump–Xi Summit
-  EU split over U.S. Trade Deal: France pushes safeguards while Germany, backed by most EU Member States and the European Commission defend status quo

April Policy Agenda



Industrial Policy

SEMI Europe to host a Semiconductor Policy Forum on June 3rd in Brussels

On June 3rd, the [SEMI Europe Policy Forum](#), the first European semiconductor-focused policy event, will take place in Brussels, Belgium. The Forum will gather senior policymakers and industry leaders to exchange views on the strategic topics shaping Europe’s technological and industrial future, from industrial policies to, trade and geopolitics, workforce development and environmental challenges. SEMI Europe will have the pleasure to welcome Members of the European Parliament, high-level representatives of the European Commission and Member States.



European Parliament suggests creating a new industrialisation instrument, including for semiconductors, and attributes dedicated budget envelopes to tech infrastructure

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) of the European Parliament has recently published its [draft position](#) on the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), a budgetary legislation dedicated to strengthening EU industrial capacities and innovation. The document introduces a new funding bridge (i.e. Horizon Europe Pathway) that aim to take successful research results from EU funded R&D projects to commercialisation and industrial uptake. This industrialisation instrument could play a decisive role in the upcoming legislative proposal for a Chips Act 2.0 which is expected to support industrial uptake and commercialisation of the first Chips Act R&D projects. The draft report further suggests reducing the overall budget line for digital, but attributes precise budget envelopes for *Technology Infrastructure* (€15 billion) and *Agile Digital Leadership* (€10

billion). Semiconductors are mentioned explicitly only in the first *Technology Infrastructure* section, which limits the ECF budget line that the Chips Act 2.0 can rely on and reduces its funding opportunities. Parliamentary members of the ITRE Committee will now debate on, and amend the draft report before they adopt their final Committee position on the text. The European Parliament will then negotiate on a final text with the representatives of the 27 EU Member States.

European Union’s institutions agree on a fast-tracked roadmap for the adoption of EU tech and industrial policies

On April 24, the 27 EU Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament [signed](#) the “[One Europe, One Market](#)” roadmap. The agreement sets joint timelines for the completion of the legislative process, and the final adoption of key policy initiatives aimed at completing and strengthening the European market. The EU institutions therefore agreed to finalise negotiations on the Chips Act 2.0 during Q2 2027 and the Cloud and AI Development Act (CAIDA) during Q4 2027. The publication of the two legislative proposals are expected on May 27, 2026, under a single EU Tech Sovereignty Package. The roadmap also lists the European Quantum Act to be finalised during Q3 2027, the Public Procurement Act and the European Research Area Act during Q4 2027 as well as the EU Cybersecurity Act by end of 2026. To achieve this agenda, European institutions will have to overcome significant challenges, including internal political divisions that have already led the European Commission to delay the publication of the Chips Act 2.0 and CAIDA proposals thrice, from February 2026 to May 2026.

European Commission enters final internal validation process ahead the publication of the Chips Act 2.0 proposal

The proposal for a Chips Act 2.0 has entered the European Commission interservice consultation on April 20. The consultation process will close on May 11. During the process, all relevant services of the European Commission will have the opportunity to submit formal opinions and raise potential legal, technical, policy blocking concerns and conflicts on the Act. Should conflicting views emerge, the lead directorate could be required to adjust the text. Hence, the publication date of the Chips Act 2.0 (expected on next May 27) as well as the content of the legislation could be influenced by the interservice consultation. Among potential blocking concerns, a longstanding conflict regarding competition policy could be raised again by the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP). In the past, DG COMP has opposed the expansion of the Chips Act state aid instrument to the entire semiconductor value chain (design, materials, equipment). This measure is expected to be a core part of the May proposal. The terms of inclusion of an EU Preference principle (e.g. EU content requirements for EU funded

projects, restricted access to public funding) will likely also be an important topic of discussion among the various Directorates-General of the Commission.

Trade & Geopolitics

The U.S. and European Union finalise Critical Minerals Action Plan

The United States and the European Union have finalised a Critical Minerals Action Plan, marking a major step toward tighter transatlantic coordination on materials essential to advanced manufacturing, including semiconductors. The agreement will serve as the main framework for aligning trade policies across critical minerals supply chains, with the goal of reducing strategic dependencies and exposure to market distortions, as confirmed by the European Commission's [Directorate-General for Trade](#) (DG TRADE).

The Action Plan reflects a shared U.S.-EU effort to counter non-market practices that have distorted supply chains for minerals crucial to semiconductors, electric vehicles and other high-tech applications. [According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative](#) (USTR), the Action Plan commits both sides to explore coordinated tools such as border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies, and offtake agreements to strengthen domestic critical minerals industries and downstream sectors. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that the initiative will lay the groundwork for a binding plurilateral agreement with like-minded partners.

On the EU side, DG Trade underlined that the Action Plan accompanies a broader EU-US Strategic Partnership on Critical Minerals, covering the full value chain from extraction and processing to recycling, while reinforcing cooperation in fora such as the G7.

Legislative proposals in the US Advance Semiconductor export control agenda

On 22 April, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) advanced [22 pieces of legislation](#) during a full committee markup, signalling bipartisan momentum to tighten controls on strategic technologies, including semiconductors. Among the most consequential measures was the [MATCH Act](#), which would curb exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and require U.S. allies to impose parallel restrictions, reinforcing a more coordinated technology denial regime.

House Select Committee on the CCP Chair John Moolenaar (R-MI) introduced the [Semiconductor Controls Adjusted to Limit Exports \(SCALE\) Act](#). The Act suggests

allowing the Department of Commerce to establish *rolling technical thresholds* for semiconductor export controls tied to China’s demonstrated domestic chip-production capabilities. The bill relies on objective performance metrics—such as processing power and memory capacity—to prevent U.S. firms from exporting chips that materially exceed what China can manufacture at scale. It makes export controls more adaptive and predictable as China’s technological capabilities evolve.

The markup prompted a [swift reaction from Beijing](#), as China warned that the proposed measures could “seriously disrupt the international economic and trade order” and threaten the stability of global semiconductor supply chains, framing the legislation as an overextension of national security policy. The warning comes ahead of a [Trump–Xi summit scheduled for May 14–15 in Beijing](#), raising concerns about potential retaliation.

Congressional pressure is also building on the administration. In a [recent letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio](#), HFAC Chair John Moolenaar urged the administration to resist weakening chip controls amid U.S.–China negotiations.

The EU-US trade deal in the process

EU member states [remain divided](#) over the future of the EU-US trade deal concluded in July 2025, as France pushes for additional safeguards while a German-led majority seeks to preserve the agreement unchanged. In line with the European Parliament position, Paris calls on adding safeguards to the initial agreement. It argues that escalating geopolitical tensions and U.S. tariff uncertainty justify the inclusion of “sunset” and “sunrise” clauses to ensure reciprocity and allow suspension if Washington fails to honour its commitments. However, most EU capitals and the Commission warn that reopening the deal risks undermining transatlantic trade stability ahead of sensitive negotiations with the U.S.